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INTRODUCTION

Like the common sense advice parents give their kids: “get it in
writing,” the parol evidence rule generally does not permit the trier
of fact to consider “he said, she said” testimony in a dispute
regarding a written contract. On its face it seems intuitive—you are
bound by the terms of your written contract. Any statements made
prior to the contract and any oral statements made
contemporaneously with a written contract are inadmissible to
contradict the terms of such written contract. It is a rule of
substantive law that results in the exclusion of extrinsic evidence.
But sometimes there are valid reasons to look at prior written
promises and/or contemporaneous oral promises; thus there are
exceptions to the parol evidence rule.
California governs the admission of parol evidence by
codification of the common law. 1 The California Code of Civil
Procedure (“Civil Code”) provides that terms set forth in a written
contract cannot be contradicted by evidence of a prior agreement
or a contemporaneous oral agreement. 2 The Civil Code further
provides that the execution of a contract in writing supersedes any
other negotiations or stipulations related to the contract’s subject
matter. 3

1. 6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN ET AL ., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.27 (Joseph
M. Perillo ed., Matthew Bender 2013).
2. CAL . CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.
and 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
3. Id. § 1625.
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In California, the exceptions to the parol evidence rule are
also codified. Civil Code section 1856, subdivision (f) “establishes a
broad exception to the operation of the parol evidence rule” 4 and
allows for the inclusion of evidence “[w]here the validity of the
agreement is the fact in dispute.” 5 Civil Code section 1856,
subdivision (g) establishes the fraud exception. 6 These two
subdivisions of the statute together allow parol evidence of fraud to
prove the invalidity of a contract. This note will further examine
the exception that parol evidence of fraud is admissible to prove
the invalidity of the agreement.
In 1935, the California Supreme Court in Bank of America v.
Pendergrass severely limited the admissibility of oral evidence of
fraud. 7 In Pendergrass, the defendants were behind in their
payments on a bank note, and a new secured note was executed. 8
Shortly thereafter the bank foreclosed on the secured property. 9
The defendants alleged that the bank had fraudulently induced
them to sign the new secured note by orally agreeing to give them
one year before they would have to make any payments. 10 The new
secured note did not contain this alleged promise and, in fact, was
payable on demand. 11 The court refused to admit the evidence of
the alleged oral promise, holding that evidence to prove fraud
could not be “directly at variance with the promise of the writing.”12
This narrow interpretation of the fraud exception became
known as the “Pendergrass rule,” 13 or the “Pendergrass limitation.”
The Pendergrass rule has been criticized, narrowly construed, and
distinguished, but for the most part has been followed by California
courts for seventy-five years.
In January 2013, for the first time in seventy-five years, the
California Supreme Court revisited the Pendergrass rule in

4. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n,
291 P.3d 316, 318 (Cal. 2013).
5. CAL . CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(f).
6. Id. § 1856(g).
7. 48 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. 1935).
8. Id. at 660.
9. Id. at 661.
10. Id. at 659.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 661.
13. Year-in-Review, Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera
Production Credit Ass’n, 55 Cal 4th 1169 (2013), 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 265, 267
(2013).
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Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Ass’n, 14
a case with very similar facts to Pendergrass. In Riverisland, borrowers
also alleged that they were induced to enter into a loan through
oral misrepresentations made by the loan officer. 15 The trial court,
following the precedent of Pendergrass, granted the lender’s motion
for summary judgment. 16 The court of appeals reversed, but did so
by distinguishing Pendergrass. 17 The California Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals and explicitly overruled Pendergrass. 18
Riverisland is a landmark decision which undoubtedly will have
a widespread effect on the relationships and interactions between
borrowers and lenders. 19 Very few borrowers actually read their
loan documents. Rather, borrowers often rely on the statements or
promises made by their loan officers in entering into the
transaction. Frequently, these promises are not in fact contained in
the loan documents. After Riverisland, lenders will no longer be
able to rely on the Pendergrass rule as a defense when making false
oral promises to borrowers that contradict the terms in the loan
agreements. 20
Riverisland will also impact other contracts, such as leases. In
the shopping center business there are sometimes lengthy
negotiations of a non-binding letter of intent prior to entering into
a lease. Often there are terms in the letter of intent which do not
make it into the lease. Also, landlord leasing agents usually give a
considerable amount of information to a prospective tenant, often
by email, which information also may not be reflected in the lease.
After Riverisland, the trier of fact will have more opportunity to
hear this extrinsic evidence, which will bring up issues as to the
elements of fraud, such as whether the tenant, which may be as
sophisticated as the landlord, justifiably relied on this extrinsic
evidence. This is the situation in Thrifty Payless, Inc., v. Americana at
14. 291 P.3d 316, 317–18 (Cal. 2013).
15. Id. at 318.
16. Id.
17. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n,
119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380, 391 (Ct. App. 2013), aff’d, 291 P.3d 316 (Cal. 2013). The
Court of Appeal, Fifth Dist., No. F058434, reversed the trial court on the basis that
Pendergrass is limited to cases of promissory fraud, holding that false statements
about the contents of the agreement itself are factual misrepresentations beyond
the scope of the Pendergrass rule. Id. This is an example of the tenuous distinctions
which courts have been forced make in order to get around the Pendergrass rule.
18. See Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 324.
19. See Year-in-Review, supra note 13, at 267.
20. See id.
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Brand, L.L.C., 21 a case which followed Riverisland and which is
discussed in this note.
There are several elements necessary to sustain a fraud action.
This note primarily focuses on the first step in such an action, the
admissibility of evidence. It then briefly discusses potential future
issues proving fraud raised by the Riverisland decision and practices
which may be adopted by businesses to protect themselves from a
claim of fraud based on statements not reflected in the written
contract.
II. HISTORY
A. The Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule, in general, “prohibits the
introduction of any extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or add to the
terms of an integrated written agreement.” 22 “An integrated
agreement is a writing or writings constituting a final expression of
one or more terms of an agreement.” 23 Under the parol evidence
rule, “‘the terms of a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement cannot be contradicted by evidence
of either a prior agreement or a contemporaneous oral
agreement.’” 24
B.

The Codification of the Parol Evidence Rule in the California Statutes

California, which is a Field Code state, 25 has statutes that
“purport[] to govern the admission of parol evidence by codifying
the common law.” 26 The parol evidence rule is codified in the Civil
Code. Section 1856, subdivision (a) provides that the “[t]erms set
forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of
21. 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2013).
22. Julius Castle Rest. Inc. v. Payne, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 850 (Ct. App.
2013).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209(1) (1981).
24. Julius Castle Rest. Inc., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 850 (quoting Singh v.
Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 469 (Ct. App. 2010)).
25. The phrase “Field Code” state refers to states whose civil codes are based
off of David Dudley Field’s code of civil procedure. See David Dudley Field,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE ACAD. EDITION, http://www.britannica
.com/EBchecked/topic/206193/David-Dudley-Field/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
New York enacted the Field Code in 1848, and thereafter the code was adopted in
whole or in part by many other U.S. states, including California. See id.
26. 6 CORBIN ET AL ., supra note 1, § 25.27.
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their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement.” 27 Section 1625 of the Civil
Code further provides that “[t]he execution of a contract in
writing, whether the law requires it to be written or not, supersedes
all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which
preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument.” 28
C.

The Parol Evidence Rule—Case Law

California case law has had a significant impact on the
substance and interpretation of the codified parol evidence rule. In
its application and treatment of the rule, case law in California has
shifted considerably over the years, resulting in a shift in the overall
reach of the rule. The case law has been across the board; from
basically gutting the parol evidence rule and allowing the trier of
fact considerable discretion in hearing extrinsic evidence, to being
very restrictive in the collateral evidence that it will allow the
judge/jury to hear. Corbin states: “[W]hile the statute is often
cited . . . it does not seem to have had that big an effect on the
California case law, perhaps because of its general terms. The
provisions quoted are widely accepted, but their application gives
courts considerable leeway.” 29
“In 1968 Chief Justice Roger Traynor . . . wrote three opinions
that . . . eviscerate[d] the parol evidence rule.” 30 But in the fortyfive years since then, the California Supreme Court has retreated
significantly from this position, becoming increasingly restrictive in
allowing the trier of fact to hear extrinsic evidence. 31

27. CAL . CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.
and 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
28. Id. § 1625.
29. 6 CORBIN ET AL ., supra note 1, § 25.27.
30. Id. (citing Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968);
Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968)). Corbin states:
Among these three opinions, it could fairly be said that they hold that
evidence of collateral contracts should be introduced fairly easily, that
there is no such thing as plain meaning, and that parol evidence
should be freely reviewed by the trial judge and sent to the jury if it is
‘reasonably susceptible’ of the meaning proposed for the words in the
written contract.
Id.
31. Id.
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In 2004, Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun affirmed the validity and
necessity of the parol evidence rule, stating that “the parol evidence
rule . . . results in the exclusion of evidence because extrinsic
evidence of the terms of the written contract is irrelevant and
cannot be relied upon.” 32 The court went on to reiterate that the
purpose of the rule is to ensure “that the parties’ final
understanding, deliberately expressed in writing, shall not be
changed.” 33 Casa Herrera illustrates how California courts sought to
uphold the parol evidence rule.
In the 2013 case of Julius Castle Restaurant, Inc. v. Payne, the
court called the parol evidence rule a “longstanding, well-known
principle that promotes fairness and predictability by encouraging
parties to specify the entirety of their agreements in writing.” 34
The court in Julius Castle Restaurant cited Masterson v. Sine, where
the rule was described as a policy “‘based on the assumption that
written evidence is more accurate than human memory,’ and ‘the
fear that fraud or unintentional invention by witnesses interested in
the outcome of the litigation will mislead the finder of facts.’” 35
The courts’ favoring of the parol evidence rule shows a
willingness to support what are perceived to be fair and predictable
outcomes. Where parties have reduced their understandings of an
agreement to a written contract, it does indeed seem fair and
predictable to rely only on what is contained within that written
contract as evidence of the parties’ agreement. However, the
courts’ strict application of the parol evidence rule may not have
always allowed enough flexibility in cases where the facts fell
slightly short of fraud.
D. The Exception: Permitting Parol Evidence of Fraud to Establish the
Invalidity of the Instrument
There is a specific exception to the parol evidence rule that
makes parol evidence of fraud admissible when used to prove the
invalidity of the contract itself. Section 1856, subdivision (f) of the
Civil Code “establishes a broad exception to the operation of the
parol evidence rule.” 36 Subdivision (f) provides that “[w]here the
32.
33.

83 P.3d 497, 502 (Cal. 2004).
Id. at 503 (citing 2 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE : DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE § 63, at 183 (4th ed. 2000)).
34. 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 850.
35. Id. (quoting Masterson, 436 P.2d at 564).
36. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n,

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5

142

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1

validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute, this section does not
exclude evidence relevant to that issue.” 37 The court in Riverisland
stated that “this provision rests on the principle that the parol
evidence rule, intended to protect the terms of a valid written
contract, should not bar evidence challenging the validity of the
agreement itself.” 38 The court, citing Civil Code section 1856,
subdivision (g), which provides that “[t]his section does not
exclude other evidence . . . to establish . . . fraud,” 39 stated that
“[e]vidence to prove that the instrument is void or voidable for . . .
fraud . . . is admissible.” 40
The fraud exception to the parol evidence rule is a common
sense one. A party who has acted fraudulently in inducing its
counterpart to enter into a written contract should not be afforded
the benefit of the parol evidence rule in attempting to defend its
fraud. In other words, where the validity of the agreement itself is
at issue, parol evidence can be admissible. The court’s application
of this exception established the circumstances under which such
evidence would be admissible. The circumstances under which the
fraud exception would be permissible have similarly shifted in
recent years.
E.

The Pendergrass Rule

Seventy-five years ago in Bank of America v. Pendergrass, 41 the
court took considerable leeway in applying the parol evidence rule
by severely narrowing the fraud exception. In 1928, the defendants
in Pendergrass took over a lettuce ranch that was “subject to a trust
deed securing a note in favor of the Bank of Italy subsequently
becoming the Bank of America.” 42 The bank also held an
unsecured note from the defendants. 43 In 1932, the principal on
both notes remained unpaid and the parties entered into
negotiations over the unpaid notes. 44 The defendants alleged that
291 P.3d 316, 319 (Cal. 2013).
37. CAL . CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(f) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.
and 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
38. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 319.
39. CAL . CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(g).
40. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 319.
41. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d 659
(Cal. 1935).
42. Id. at 660.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 660–61.
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the bank promised them (orally) that if they would execute a new
note secured by a chattel mortgage, crop mortgage, and all the
property owned by the defendants which at that time was
unencumbered, “they would not be required ‘to make any
payments on their indebtedness, either interest or principal, until
this money came in from the 1932 crop,’” and the bank would
extend or postpone all payments for one year. 45 This oral promise
was not set forth in the loan documents, and the new note, in fact,
was payable on demand. 46 Within a short time after the execution
of the new note and mortgages, the bank seized all the property
covered by the mortgages. 47 The defendants alleged that the note
was fraudulently obtained based on the oral promise to forgive
payments for one year, after which payments would be made out of
crop sales. 48 The bank did not honor this oral promise and the
defendants further alleged that it had no intention of honoring
such a promise. 49
The court reversed in part and sent the case back on remand,
holding that testimony as to the alleged oral promise of the bank
would not be allowed on remand. 50 The court reasoned that the
alleged oral promise of the bank was “in direct contravention of the
unconditional promise [of the borrower] contained in the note to
pay the money on demand.” 51 It further held that “the rule which
permits parol evidence of fraud to establish the invalidity of the
instrument . . . [cannot be] a promise directly at variance with the
promise of the writing.” 52
Pendergrass established a strict adherence to the parol evidence
rule in disallowing the application of the fraud exception. In
holding that the fraud exception cannot be applied where an oral
promise is in direct contradiction to a promise contained in a
written contract, the court severely limited the fraud exception’s
reach. So long as a potentially fraudulent oral statement was
specifically addressed in the written contract, the counterparty to
the contract could not raise an allegation of fraud. While this seems
to reflect common sense (and clearly affirm the adage “read before
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 661.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 660–61.
See id. at 659, 661.
See id. at 661–62.
Id. at 661.
Id.
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you sign”) it may not necessarily account for inequality of
bargaining power and other disparities between two parties to a
contract.
F.

Reactions to Pendergrass

Despite much criticism, Pendergrass survived for over seventyfive years with the courts of appeal generally following the decision,
“albeit with varying degrees of fidelity.” 53 The primary ground for
attacking Pendergrass has been that it is inconsistent with section
1856, subdivisions (f) and (g) of the Civil Code which, taken
together, provide that parol evidence of fraud may be introduced
to establish that a contract is invalid, and state no limitations. 54 The
Restatement provides that evidence is admissible for the purpose of
proving fraud, without restriction. 55 Most of the treatises agree that
evidence of fraud is an exception to the parol evidence rule with
limitation 56 and the majority of other jurisdictions follow this
traditional rule. 57
In Riverisland, the court engages in a lengthy criticism of
Pendergrass, ranging from the fact that “its limitation on . . . fraud
may itself further fraudulent practices” to the “tenuous” distinction
between promises deemed inconsistent with the writing and those
deemed consistent. 58
“In 1977 the California Law Revision Commission ignored
Pendergrass when it proposed modifications to the statutory
53. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n,
291 P.3d 316, 320 (Cal. 2013) (citing Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 83 P.3d 497,
504 (Cal. 2004)); Duncan v. McCaffrey Grp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280, 297–303
(Ct. App. 2011) (reviewing cases); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735,
745 (Ct. App. 1989) (discussing criticism); Justin Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the
Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CAL . L. REV. 877 (1961) (criticizing Pendergrass)).
54. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 320 (citing Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr.
30, 35 (Ct. App. 1971); James P. Anderson, IV, Note, Parol Evidence: Admissibility to
Show That a Promise Was Made Without Intention to Perform It, 38 CAL . L. REV. 535, 538
(1950); Sweet, supra note 53, at 877).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(d) cmt. c–d (1971).
56. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 320 (citing 6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH M.
PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.20[A], at 277–80 (rev. ed. 2010); E. ALLEN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.4, at 245–46 (3d ed. 2004); 11
RICHARD LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 33:17, at 632–33 (4th ed. 1999)).
57. Id. (citing Airs Int’l, Inc. v. Perfect Scents Distrib., 902 F. Supp. 1141,
1156 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Pinnacle Peak Dev. v. TRW Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 540,
545 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Touche Ross Ltd. v. Filipek, 778 P.2d 721, 728 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1989); Sweet, supra note 53, at 889).
58. Id. at 320–21.
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formulation of the parol evidence rule.” 59 In designing revisions to
the statute, the Commission identified three cases for consideration
by the legislature and “[c]onspicuously omitted . . . any mention of
Pendergrass and its . . . limitation on the fraud exception.” 60 The
Commission’s proposed revisions, which were adopted by the
legislature and which were based on Coast Bank v. Holmes 61—a case
strongly critical of Pendergrass—left the statutory exceptions relating
to the validity of the agreement and fraud substantively
unchanged. 62
Pendergrass also had supporters and was not completely without
backing in the treatises and law reviews. 63 In Price v. Wells Fargo Bank
the court observed that the “broad doctrine of promissory fraud
may allow parties to litigate disputes over the meaning of contract
terms armed with an arsenal of tort remedies inappropriate to the
resolution of commercial disputes.” 64 A fairly recent law review
comment, while critical of Pendergrass, nevertheless favored limiting
the fraud exception’s scope for sophisticated parties. 65
III. RIVERISLAND
In January 2013, the Supreme Court of California overturned
the seventy-five year old Pendergrass rule in Riverisland Cold Storage,
Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Association. 66
The plaintiffs in Riverisland, ranchers Lance and Pamela
Workman, fell behind in their loan payments to the defendant, and
the parties agreed to a restructured debt agreement (“Debt
Agreement”). 67 The Debt Agreement, dated March 26, 2007,
pledged eight separate parcels of real property as additional
collateral and provided that if the Workmans made certain
59. Id. at 321.
60. Id.
61. Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30 (Ct. App. 1971).
62. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 321–22.
63. Id. at 322 (citing Duncan v. McCaffrey Grp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280
(Ct. App. 2011); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Ct. App.
1991); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1989); 9 WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 2439, at 130 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981); Alicia W. Macklin,
The Fraud Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule: Necessary Protection for Fraud Victims or
Loophole for Clever Parties?, 82 S. CAL . L. REV. 809, 812–13 (2009); Sweet, supra note
53, at 883).
64. Price, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
65. Macklin, supra note 63, at 830.
66. 291 P.3d at 316.
67. Id. at 317.
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specified payments, the Credit Association would take no
enforcement action until July 1, 2007. 68 The Workmans did not
make the required payments, and on March 1, 2008, the Credit
Association started foreclosure proceedings—which were later
dismissed when the Workmans repaid the loan. 69 The Workmans
then filed an action seeking damages for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation and asking for rescission and reformation of the
Debt Agreement. 70
The Workmans alleged that before the Debt Agreement was
signed, David Ylarregui, a Vice President of the Credit Association,
told them that the Credit Association would extend the loan for
two years in exchange for two ranches being pledged as additional
collateral. 71 The Workmans further alleged that Ylarregui
reaffirmed these terms at the time the Debt Agreement was
signed. 72 As noted, the terms of the Debt Agreement provided for
approximately three months, not two years, of forbearance and had
eight, not two, parcels of real property as collateral. 73 The
Workmans did not read the Debt Agreement before they signed
it. 74
The Credit Association moved for summary judgment on the
basis that the parol evidence rule barred the admission of any oral
evidence which contradicted the terms of the written debt
agreement. 75 The Workmans argued that the evidence of the oral
promise was admissible under the fraud exception to the parol
evidence rule. 76
Relying on the Pendergrass rule that “the fraud exception does
not allow parol evidence . . . at odds with the terms of the written
agreement,” the trial court granted summary judgment.77 The court
of appeals reversed and distinguished this case from Pendergrass by
reasoning that Pendergrass is limited to cases of promissory fraud
(i.e., actions where a defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 318.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to enter into a contract), and that this was a case of actual fraud
(i.e., a promise without any intention of performing it). 78
The California Supreme Court “overrule[d] Pendergrass and its
progeny, and reaffirm[ed] the venerable maxim stated in Ferguson
v. Koch: ‘[I]t was never intended that the parol evidence rule
should be used as a shield to prevent the proof of fraud.’” 79 The
court noted that, prior to Pendergrass, cases “routinely stated
without qualification that parol evidence was admissible to prove
fraud,” 80 that “[h]istorically, this unconditional rule was applied in
cases of promissory fraud,” 81 and that two years after Pendergrass, the
court again “fell back on the old rule in a promissory fraud case.” 82
The ruling was based on the fact that Pendergrass was “plainly out of
step with established California law” and was “an aberration.” 83 The
court reached this conclusion after a discussion of Pendergrass and
the subsequent reactions, 84 stating:
There are multiple reasons to question whether
Pendergrass has stood the test of time. It has been criticized
as bad policy. Its limitation on the fraud exception is
inconsistent with the governing statute, and the
Legislature did not adopt that limitation when it revised
section 1856 based on a survey of California case law
construing the parol evidence rule. Pendergrass’s
divergence from the path followed by the Restatements,
the majority of other states, and most commentators is
cause for concern, and leads us to doubt whether
restricting fraud claims is necessary to serve the purposes
of the parol evidence rule. Furthermore, the functionality
of the Pendergrass limitation has been called into question

78. Id. at 318 n.3 (citing CAL . CIV. PROC. CODE § 1572(4) (West, Westlaw
through 2013 Reg. Sess. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (defining actual fraud as “[a]
promise made without any intention of performing it”); Lazar v. Superior Court,
909 P.2d 981, 985 (Cal. 1996) (“An action for promissory fraud may lie where a
defendant fraudulently induces the plaintiff to enter into a contract.”); 5 B.E.
WITKIN, WITKIN LEGAL INST., SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 781, at 1131–32 (10th
ed. 2005)).
79. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 324 (third alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Ferguson v. Koch, 268 P. 342, 347 (Cal. 1928)).
80. Id. at 323.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 324.
84. Id. at 322–25.
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by the vagaries of its interpretations in the Courts of
Appeal. 85
IV. CASES AFTER RIVERISLAND
A. Julius Castle Restaurant, Inc. v. Payne: Unsuccessful Arguments
for the Fraud Exception Not Applying to a Sophisticated Party,
Contracts of Adhesion, or Where There Is Disparity of Bargaining
Power.
In Julius Castle Restaurant Inc. v. Payne, Julius Castle Restaurant,
Inc. (“tenant”) leased from Payne (“landlord”) a historic San
Francisco restaurant which had been closed for almost a year. 86 The
tenant’s principal was a sophisticated restaurateur with over thirtyfive years of experience in the restaurant business. 87 After
“extensive negotiations,” the parties signed a lease and agreement
“for the purchase of the restaurant’s assets.” 88 Subsequent to the
restaurant opening, the landlord and tenant argued over the repair
of faulty equipment.89 When the restaurant failed after six months,
a lawsuit ensued. 90
One of the tenant’s causes of action was based on the
landlord’s alleged oral misrepresentations that the restaurant
facility and equipment were in good condition and assurances that
the landlord would take care of anything not in good condition. 91
The terms of the lease directly contradicted these alleged oral
statements, providing that the tenant had inspected the premises
and all improvements, and that the tenant acknowledged that the
premises and all improvements were in good condition, order, and
repair. 92 The lease also contained an integration or merger clause,
which provided that the lease (and contract for sale of the
restaurant’s assets) constituted the sole agreement between the
landlord and tenant with respect to the premises, and that any

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 322.
157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 841 (Ct. App. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 844.
See id. at 845–48.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 841–42.
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representations regarding the premises not expressly set forth in
the lease were void. 93
Based on Riverisland, the trial court admitted the parol
evidence of the alleged oral misrepresentations, and the jury found
in favor of the tenant on the misrepresentation claims. 94 The
appellate court concluded that, in light of Riverisland, the parol
evidence was properly admitted at trial under the statutory
exception for fraud. 95
On appeal, the landlord argued that “even under Riverisland,
the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule is not applied to
agreements entered into by sophisticated parties after extensive
negotiations.” 96 In support of its argument, the landlord asserted
that the supreme court in Riverisland relied on authorities holding
forth a rule that “sophisticated parties can rarely invoke the fraud
exception.” 97 The appellate court disagreed, stating:
While the court may have cited to authorities that discuss
a potential exception for sophisticated parties,
defendants’ premise is unsupported by the language of
the opinion itself. To the contrary, the court decisively
overruled Pendergrass . . . the court did not shield
sophisticated parties from the reach of its holding . . . . In
our view . . . our high court sought . . . to create certainty
and consistency by eliminating altogether the judicially
created exception to section 1856, subdivision (g). We
also note that the plaintiffs in Riverisland appear to have
been relatively sophisticated business people. 98
The landlord also argued on appeal that Riverisland is “strong
medicine” and should be applied only in “contracts of adhesion
where there is a disparity in bargaining power.” 99 The appellate
court also disagreed with this argument, stating that “[a]gain, the
court did not limit its holding to contracts of adhesion and we
decline to read such a limitation into the decision.” 100 The appellate
court advised that “[i]n the post-Riverisland world, parties would be

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 842.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 852–53.
Id. at 852 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 853.
Id.
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better served in addressing the heightened burden of proving
fraud in a civil action.” 101
B.

Bertino & Associates v. R L Young, Inc.: The United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, Applying California Law, Holds
That the Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Apply to Subsequent
Agreements.

In August of this year, in Bertino & Associates v. R L Young, Inc.,
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, applying
California law, cited Riverisland in holding that the parol evidence
rule does not apply to oral agreements made subsequent to the
final written agreement. 102
On July 6, 2010, Bertino and Young entered into a written
agreement (“Agreement”) “whereby Bertino agreed to provide [to
Young] certain consulting [s]ervices” related to the expansion of
Young’s business (“Services”). 103 The Agreement provided for a
one-year term, renewable annually, “unless either party
terminated.” 104 Bertino alleged that he and Young had actually
agreed to a five-year term, but that he signed the Agreement
anyway based on oral assurances made by Mike Kurz, Young’s Chief
Financial Officer, that “as long as Young’s expansion . . . was
successful, the Agreement[]” would be for five years. 105 Bertino
further alleged that Kurz reiterated these same assurances after the
Agreement was signed. 106
The Agreement provided that it would be “governed by the
laws of the State of California.” 107 It also contained an integration or
merger clause, which provided that the Agreement was the entire
agreement between the parties concerning the Services, that it
superseded all previous contracts concerning the subject matter,
and that no modification or waiver of the Agreement would be
effective unless in writing signed by the parties. 108 “On July 6, 2011,
the Agreement automatically renewed for another one-year

101.
102.
Aug. 1,
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 852.
No. 12-6603, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108038, at *9–12, *23–24 (D.N.J.
2013).
Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *19.
Id. at *6.
Id.
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term.” 109 On “March 23, 2012, Young informed Bertino that it
intended to terminate the Agreement effective April 1, 2012,” and
Young did terminate the Agreement. 110
In the resulting lawsuit, one of Bertino’s claims was that the
term was for five years, based on the fact that Young had orally
agreed, both before and after Bertino executed the Agreement,
that the term would be five years. 111 “Young argue[d] that the
Agreement’s integration clause precludes, as a matter of law, any
conclusion that the term . . . was five years” based on such oral
statements. 112 The Bertino court, citing Riverisland 113 and California’s
parol evidence rule, 114 held that evidence of the five-year term
would not be barred at this stage of the proceedings. 115 The court
based its holding on the conclusion that the parol evidence rule
bars evidence of oral agreements reached before or simultaneously
with the written agreement, and this was a subsequent
agreement. 116
C.

Groth-Hill Land Co. v. General Motors L.L.C.: The Fraud
Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Apply Where the
Validity of the Agreement Is Not the Fact in Dispute.

In a case decided in July 2013, Groth-Hill Land Co. v. General
Motors L.L.C., the defendants argued that the plaintiffs were barred
from raising alleged oral promises which contradicted the terms of
the written contracts. 117 This case involved two plaintiffs, both
defunct, family-owned General Motors car dealerships. 118 The
dealerships fell into financial difficulties in 2008 and became
delinquent on their inventory loans with one of the defendants,
109. Id. at *7.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *19.
112. Id. at *22–23.
113. Id. at *23 (citing Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod.
Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 318–19 (Cal. 2013)).
114. CAL . CIV. PROC. CODE § 1856(f) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.
and 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (“Terms set forth in a writing intended by the parties
as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included
therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement.” (emphasis added)).
115. Bertino, No. 12-6603, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108038, at *23.
116. Id.
117. Groth-Hill Land Co. v. Gen. Motors L.L.C., No. C13-1362 TEH, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 103039, at *47 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2013).
118. Id. at *2–3.
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Ally Financial Inc. (“Ally”), a division of General Motors. 119 Ally
provided the inventory financing to the dealerships. 120
In the promissory fraud claim, the plaintiffs alleged that one of
the defendants, Kevin Wrate, the director of sales for Ally, made
false oral promises to them on the phone. 121 According to the
plaintiffs, Wrate said that Ally would not terminate its inventory
financing plan with them if the plaintiffs executed personal
guarantees for their delinquent inventory loans. 122 Such guarantees
were to be secured by pledging certain real property to Ally and
selling property with the proceeds going to Ally. 123
The defendants claimed that the parol evidence rule barred
the evidence of the oral promises by Wrate, “which directly
contradict the terms of the written agreements” between the
parties. 124 The court agreed, stating that the “[p]laintiffs do not
attack the validity of the written agreements.” 125 The court, citing
Riverisland, 126 stated that the “[p]laintiffs are correct that a fraud
exception to the parol evidence rule permits the use of extrinsic
evidence to attack the validity of an integrated written
agreement.” 127 However, the court distinguished this case from
Riverisland, stating that the “[p]laintiffs in their promissory fraud
claim do not attack the validity of [the agreements]” but instead
“seek to recover based on promises [the Defendant] allegedly
made to them over the phone, promises which run counter to the
terms of the written contracts.” 128 The court stated that “[t]he fraud
exception to the parol evidence rule does not apply in these
circumstances; the parol evidence rule does.” 129 Accordingly, the
court found that the promissory fraud claim was based on these
alleged oral promises and dismissed the claim with prejudice. 130

119. Id. at *3–4.
120. Id. at *2–4.
121. Id. at *43–44.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *44.
125. Id. at *47.
126. Id. at *48 (citing Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod.
Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 318–19 (Cal. 2013)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at *48–49.
129. Id. at *49.
130. See id.
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D. Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Americana at Brand, L.L.C.: Extrinsic
Evidence Is Admissible to Establish Fraud or Intentional or Negligent
Misrepresentation in the Face of the Lease’s Integration Clause.
Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Americana at Brand, L.L.C., 131 decided in
August 2013, involved a shopping center landlord who allegedly
made fraudulent prior written promises to a retail tenant that
contradicted the terms of the lease.
Plaintiff Thrifty Payless (“tenant”) d/b/a Rite Aid was a tenant
of Americana at Brand’s (“landlord”) shopping center in Glendale,
California. 132 Prior to the development of the shopping center and
the execution of the lease, the parties negotiated the basic terms to
be included in the lease through an exchange of a letter of intent
(LOI). 133 The LOI stated the landlord’s per square foot estimate of
the tenant’s probable pro rata share of property taxes, insurance,
and common area maintenance (CAM), and estimated CAM at
$14.50 per square foot. 134 In the final draft of the LOI, the tenant
crossed out the estimate and wrote in, “Budget to be provided to
tenant prior to lease execution.” 135 Prior to the execution of the
lease, the landlord provided the tenant with a detailed breakdown
of CAM in a letter which stated, “I have . . . attached our
preliminary CAM budget for your eyes only, so that you may be
armed with necessary explanations as to CAM costs. Please
remember that the costs reflected are purely estimated values.” 136
The breakdown showed CAM estimated at $14.35 per square
foot. 137 The fully executed lease provided that the tenant would pay
its pro rata share of CAM, and did not mention the estimates set
forth in the LOI or the breakdown letter. 138 The first year that the
tenant was obligated to pay its share of taxes, insurance, and CAM,
the tenant’s share of these expenses was more than double the
amount set forth in the LOI and the breakdown letter. 139 The

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 721.
Id.
Id. at 722.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tenant sued the landlord seeking damages and rescission, and
alleging, among other things, fraud. 140
Based on the integration clause in the lease, the landlord
argued that all prior negotiations, including the LOI and the
breakdown letter, were inadmissible. 141 The tenant countered that
the prior writings were admissible to show fraud, notwithstanding
the integration clause. 142 On the issue of the parol evidence rule,
the court cited Riverisland 143 and stated that “an established
exception to the [parol evidence] rule allows a party to present
extrinsic evidence to show that the agreement was procured by
fraud.” 144 The court stated,
Here, under Riverisland, extrinsic evidence is
admissible
to
establish
fraud
or
negligent
misrepresentation in the face of the lease’s integration
clause. Thus, [the tenant] can allege both intentional and
negligent misrepresentations based upon [the landlord]’s
grossly inaccurate estimates.
Further, [the tenant] had adequately pleaded facts to
show its reliance was reasonable given the parties’
previous dealings . . . and because [the landlord] had
superior knowledge and information . . . . 145
The court held that “[t]he trial court therefore erred in
sustaining [the landlord]’s demurrer to [the tenant]’s . . . causes of
action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and [the tenant]
should be permitted to amend its complaint to set forth additional
facts supporting these claims.” 146
V. THE POST-RIVERISLAND W ORLD
Riverisland will undoubtedly inspire due care in regard to oral
statements when entering into a written contract. Before
Riverisland, loan officers eager to close more loans may have felt
protected in making oral misrepresentations, confident in the
knowledge that very few borrowers actually read their loan

140. Id. at 722–23.
141. Id. at 724.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 726 (citing Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod.
Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316 (Cal. 2013)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 727–28 (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 728.
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documents. Given that at least the first barrier to proving fraud, the
admissibility of the extrinsic evidence, has now been lessened,
lenders may be more reluctant to undertake such a practice.
As allegations of contemporaneous oral and prior written
misrepresentations—which may not have been admissible
previously—will be increasingly considered, Riverisland may result
in more cases addressing the justifiable reliance element of fraud.
Courts may now be confronted with the issue of whether it is
reasonable to rely on prior written or contemporaneous oral
representations directly contradicted by, or not addressed at all, in
the written agreement.
The California Supreme Court in Riverisland discussed the
difficulty in establishing promissory fraud and the requisite
element of proof of intent not to perform. 147 The court stated “[i]t
is insufficient to show an unkept but honest promise, or mere
subsequent failure of performance.” 148 The court stressed that
“promissory fraud, like all forms of fraud, requires a showing of
justifiable reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentation.” 149 The
court, noting that the defendants alleged that “the Workmans
failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue on the
element of reliance, given their admitted failure to read the
contract,” declined to address the issue of reliance in the first
instance, as neither the trial court nor the court of appeals reached
the issue of reliance. 150
The court in Julius Castle Restaurant stated that “[a] party
claiming fraud in the inducement is still required to prove they
relied on the parol evidence and that their reliance was
reasonable.” 151 The court noted that “[i]n the present case, the
burden was on plaintiffs to prove that, notwithstanding both the
Lease’s integration clause and the ‘as is’ language with respect to
the restaurant equipment, they reasonably relied on Payne’s prior
oral assurances in entering into the agreements.” 152
While the court in Julius Castle Restaurant rejected the
argument that the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
2013).
152.

Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 325.
Id. at 325 (citing Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., 702 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985)).
Id. (citing Lazar v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 981, 984 (Cal. 1996)).
Id.
Julius Castle Rest. Inc. v. Payne, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 853 (Ct. App.
Id.
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should not be “applied to agreements entered into by sophisticated
parties after extensive negotiations,” 153 it left open the issue of how
much weight the trier of fact may give to the relative sophistication
of the parties and extent of negotiations in determining justifiable
reliance. 154 The court advised that “in the post-Riverisland world,
parties would be better served in addressing the heightened
burden of proving fraud in a civil action.” 155 One of the elements in
the heightened burden of proving fraud is whether the party
claiming that it relied on the fraudulent parol evidence was
justified in such reliance. 156 This element takes on a different light
when all parties are experienced in the business being transacted
and all parties use skillful lawyers who negotiate the agreement
over a considerable time and co-draft numerous revisions.
Even in situations where the parties are equally sophisticated
and where experienced lawyers conduct extensive negotiations and
co-draft the contract, one party may have more experience in the
particular matter at issue or may have information to which the
other party does not have access. Under these circumstances, it may
be justifiable for the party without such particular experience or
access to such information to rely on prior writings or
contemporaneous oral representations.
In Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Americana at Brand, L.L.C., 157 the party
claiming fraud was Thrifty/Payless, Inc. d/b/a Rite Aid, a multibillion dollar company with over three thousand drug stores:
clearly a sophisticated business operator. 158 Most likely both the
landlord and tenant used experienced real estate attorneys, with
particular expertise in shopping center leases and CAM issues, to
negotiate the lease. The LOI was negotiated over a three-month
period. 159 The time between the final LOI and the final lease, which
contained a merger/integration clause, was about nine months. 160
Thus, both parties were equally sophisticated business entities
whose experienced attorneys not only read the lease but most likely
co-drafted it. The issue came down to Americana’s particular
153. Id. at 852.
154. Id. at 853.
155. Id. at 852.
156. WITKIN, supra note 78, at 1121.
157. 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2013).
158. See Rite Aid Corporation, NYSE EURONEXT, http://www.nyse.com/about
/listed/rad.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2013).
159. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 721–22.
160. Id.
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expertise in developing and managing shopping centers and access
to specific knowledge about this project and similar projects built
by Americana to which Thrifty did not have access.
Thrifty asserted that “its reliance was reasonable based on
Americana’s superior knowledge and experience building and
operating shopping centers of similar size and scope; because
Americana was familiar with the level of common area services to
be provided, the terms of other leases contemporaneously being
negotiated, the insurance policies to be obtained.” 161 The court,
citing Furla v. Jon Douglas Co., stated that “[a] statement couched as
an opinion, by one having special knowledge of the subject, may be
treated as an actionable misstatement of fact.” 162 The court found:
Thrifty had adequately pleaded facts to show its reliance
was reasonable given the parties’ previous dealings . . .
and because Americana had superior knowledge and
information: Americana likely had a better understanding
of how the property would be assessed for tax purposes
and what insurance coverage would cost; such knowledge
would form the basis of its share of calculations for its
tenants, and as an owner and manager of other shopping
malls, could better calculate the cost of running the
common facilities. Since Americana had all or most of the
information regarding the unfinished shopping center,
Thrifty was not in a position to discover for itself a close
approximation of the ultimate common costs. 163
Landlords may want to be more careful when making
statements in a LOI or in e-mails that are not ultimately
incorporated into the lease, but that tenants may claim they relied
upon. In Thrifty Payless, the estimates were so far from the actual
CAM amounts as to lead credence to the claim of fraud. Landlords
may also want to look carefully at the language of the
integration/merger clause. There may be ways to draft these
clauses to give them more weight.
Some shopping center owners have implemented strategies for
dealing with potential allegations of oral or written representations
made outside of the lease by having tenants sign a separate
statement, outside of the lease, confirming that the leasing

161. Id. at 723.
162. Id. at 727 (citing Furla v. Jon Douglas Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 911, 917 (Ct.
App. 1998)).
163. Id. at 728.
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representatives have not made any promises or representations
concerning sales volumes, occupancy, exclusives, tax estimates,
estimates of common area maintenance costs (where they are not
fixed), and similar matters not addressed in the lease. This type of
separate statement may be helpful to the trier of fact in
determining the veracity of a “he said she said” claim made by a
tenant. The trier of fact should give more weight to such a separate
statement than to a merger/integration clause, which is usually in
the boilerplate portion of the lease and may not be focused upon
in the lease negotiation process. If there is a merger or integration
clause in the agreement, any such separate statement should
probably be dated after the date of the lease so that it is clearly a
subsequent writing. The following is an example of what such a
separate statement might look like in a shopping center leasing
transaction:
TENANT CERTIFICATION
The undersigned (“Tenant”) has entered into a lease
prior to the date hereof (“Lease”), with _______________
(“Landlord”), for premises particularly described in the
Lease (“Premises”) which Premises are located in a
shopping center particularly described in the Lease
(“Center”). The business terms of the Lease were
negotiated solely with __________ as a representative of
Landlord (“Landlord Representative”). Tenant certifies to
Landlord that neither the Landlord Representative nor
any other representative, agent or employee of Landlord
represented, promised or implied any of the following
(except as expressly provided in the Lease): (i) that
Tenant would be given an exclusive use in the Center, or
(ii) that Landlord would not lease space in the Center to a
competitor of Tenant or to another tenant with the same
or similar use as Tenant; or (iii) that a certain tenant
would become or remain an occupant of the Center, or
(iv) that the number of occupants open at the Center
would remain at a certain level, or (v) that Tenant will be
able to achieve a certain sales amount, or (vi) that taxes
and/or common area charges would be at a specified
amount (Tenant acknowledging that estimates of same
may not reflect actual amounts).
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VII. APPLICATION TO MINNESOTA
Riverisland has lessened the initial barrier to bringing a fraud
case to trial in California by allowing, in more instances, extrinsic
evidence of fraud to be heard by the trier of fact. The issue of
reasonable reliance on that extrinsic evidence will be litigated more
often in California, and these cases may have an impact on
Minnesota law. In determining reasonable reliance, it is likely that
courts will consider the weight to give an integration/merger
clause, the sophistication of the parties, the experience and
superior knowledge of the parties in the particular area at issue,
and the inequality of bargaining power. Riverisland and the cases
following or distinguishing Riverisland may impact the way the
business community in Minnesota handles the contract negotiation
process. Businesses in Minnesota may want to adopt new policies to
protect themselves from a claim of fraud based on statements not
reflected in the written contract, such as the separate tenant
certification set forth above.
While the full extent and impact of Riverisland remains to be
seen, it is a pivotal case that already has affected business as usual in
California and will likely affect business in Minnesota as well.
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